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1 Introduction
Employer-sponsored defined contribution (DC) accounts have gained significant importance
around the world. In the United States, the value of 401(k) assets reached $4.2 trillion
in 2013. The growth represents important business opportunities for mutual funds as they
manage approximately half of the 401(k) investment pool.1 In addition to asset management,
many fund families also provide administrative services to the plans and therefore play an
active role in creating the menu of investment options for the plans’ participants.
Fund families involved in the plan’s design often face conflicting incentives. While they
have an incentive to include their own proprietary funds on the menu, even when more suitable
options are available from other fund families,2 they are also pressured by plan sponsors to
create menus that serve the interests of plan participants. Surprisingly, little is known about
whether and how these conflicting incentives influence 401(k) menus. This is concerning given
that DC accounts are the main source of retirement income for many of the beneficiaries.
In this paper, we examine the conflicting incentives of mutual fund companies in the 401(k)
industry. Building on Cohen and Schmidt (2009), we collect information on the identity of
the trustee of employer-sponsored 401(k) plans. Focusing on menu changes, we hypothesize
that these service providers are inclined to include their own funds on the investment menu
and subsequently reluctant to remove them. Additionally, they may be less sensitive to the
performance of their own funds in menu altering decisions as they have an incentive to support
their own proprietary funds.
To investigate this favoritism hypothesis, we hand collect information on the menu of
mutual fund options offered in a large sample of 401(k) plans for the period 1998 to 2009 from
annual filings of Form 11-K with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Our
1Federal Reserve Statistical Releases and Investment Company Institute (ICI).
2See the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2011) report on “Improved Regulation Could Better
Protect Participants from Conflicts of Interest”.
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sample includes plans that are trusteed by a mutual fund family as well as plans with non-
mutual fund trustees. Most 401(k) plans in our sample adopt an open architecture whereby
investment options include not only funds from the trustee’s family (“affiliated funds”) but
those from other mutual fund families as well (“unaffiliated funds”). An interesting feature
of our dataset is that a given fund often contemporaneously appears on several 401(k) menus
that are administered by different fund families. This data feature provides us with an unique
identification strategy and allows us to contrast how the very same fund is viewed across
menus where the fund is affiliated with the trustee and menus where it is not.
Our results reveal significant favoritism toward affiliated funds. Affiliated funds are more
likely to be added and less likely to be removed from 401(k) plans. The biggest relative
difference between how affiliated and unaffiliated funds are treated on the menu occurs for the
worst performing funds, which have been shown to exhibit significant performance persistence
(Carhart, 1997). For example, mutual funds ranked in the lowest decile based on their prior
three-year performance have a deletion rate of 25.5% per year if they are unaffiliated with
the plan’s trustee and a deletion rate of just 13.7% if they are affiliated with the trustee. On
the other hand, funds in the top performance decile have a deletion rate of around 15% for
both affiliated and unaffiliated trustees. Protecting poorly-performing funds by keeping them
on the menu helps mutual fund families to dampen the outflow of capital triggered by poor
performance and, as a result, mitigates fund distress.
Although the investment opportunity set of the plan is limited to the available menu
choices, participants can freely allocate their contributions among these options. If partici-
pants are aware of provider biases or are simply sensitive to poor performance, they can - at
least partially - undo favoritism in their own portfolios by, for instance, not allocating capi-
tal to poorly-performing affiliated funds. Therefore, to test whether menu favoritism has an
impact on the overall allocation of plan assets, we examine the sensitivity of participant flows
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to the performance of affiliated and unaffiliated funds. Consistent with studies documenting
that DC plan participants are naive and inactive (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Madrian and
Shea, 2001; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003), we show that participants are generally not
sensitive to poor performance and do not undo the menu’s bias toward affiliated families. This
in turn indicates that plan participants are affected by the affiliation bias.
Finally, while our evidence on favoritism is consistent with adverse incentives, fund families
may also have superior information about their own proprietary funds. Therefore, it is possible
that they show a strong preference for these funds not because they are necessarily biased
toward them, but rather, due to favorable information they possess about these funds. To
investigate this possibility, we examine future fund performance. For instance, if – despite
lackluster past performance – the decision to keep poorly-performing affiliated funds on the
menu is information driven, then these funds should perform better in the future. We find
that this is not the case: affiliated funds that rank poorly based on past performance but are
not deleted from the menu do not perform well in the subsequent year. We estimate that, on
average, they underperform by approximately 3.96% annually on a risk- and style-adjusted
basis. These results suggest that the menu bias we document in this paper has important
implications for the employees’ income in retirement.
Our study belongs to a nascent literature on the effect of business ties in DC plans. Davis
and Kim (2007) and Cohen and Schmidt (2009) study conflicts of interest in the 401(k)
industry and argue that to protect the valuable business relation that arises between the
sponsoring company and mutual fund service providers, families cater to the sponsors while
compromising their own fiduciary responsibilities. In particular, Cohen and Schmidt (2009)
find that trustee fund families overinvest in the sponsor’s stock. They also show that when
other mutual funds sell the stock, trustees tend to trade in the opposite direction thereby
supporting the stock price of distressed firms. Davis and Kim (2007) document that mutual
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fund votes in shareholder meetings are influenced by 401(k) business ties.
Our paper is also related to two additional areas of study. First, we contribute to the
broader literature that focuses on the design and characteristics of DC plans.3 Second, our
paper is related to the literature on favoritism in mutual fund families. Gaspar, Massa, and
Matos (2006) show that fund families strategically transfer performance across member funds
to favor those funds that are more likely to increase overall family profits.4 We provide evidence
that families favor their proprietary funds when they act as service providers of 401(k) plans.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides information on the
institutional, economic, and legal background of DC plans. Section 3 describes our data
collection and provides summary statistics of our 401(k) plans as well as the mutual funds
offered on the plans’ menu. Sections 4–6 discuss our results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
401(k) menus are jointly determined by the plan sponsor (i.e., employer) and the plan’s service
providers. Service providers often offer bundled arrangements through which the same entity
provides trustee, record keeping, and educational services.5 In addition to these administrative
3Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Madrian and Shea (2001), Choi et al. (2002, 2004), Del Guercio and Tkac
(2002), Duflo and Saez (2002), Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003), Huberman and Jiang (2006), Elton,
Gruber, and Blake (2006, 2007), Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007), Goyal and Wahal (2008), Carroll et al.
(2009), Tang et al. (2010), Balduzzi and Reuter (2012), Brown and Harlow (2012), Mitchell and Utkus (2012),
Goldreich and Halaburda (2013), Christoffersen and Simutin (2014), and Sialm, Starks, and Zhang (2015)
study the structure of pension plans and provide evidence that retirement savers are subject to behavioral
biases and rarely adjust their portfolios.
4Additionally, Reuter (2006) shows that lead underwriters use allocations of underpriced IPOs to reward
those institutions with which they have strong business relationships. Kuhnen (2009) finds that fund directors
and advisory firms that manage the funds hire each other preferentially based on the intensity of their past
interactions. Bhattacharya, Lee, and Pool (2013) find that affiliated funds of mutual funds cross-subsidize
those funds in their complex that experience liquidity shortfalls.
5In this paper we use the term “service provider” to refer to those entities that provide administrative
services to 401(k) plans. These services include trustee services (i.e., providing the safe holding of the plan’s
assets in a trust), recordkeeping services (i.e., maintaining plan records, processing contributions and distri-
butions, and issuing statements), participant education (i.e., online or face-to-face investment education), and
compliance services (i.e., preparation of forms and legal services). Over 90% of the mutual fund trustees in
our sample are also recordkeepers of the same plan. A description of the services provided is available at:
http://www.ici.org/pdf/per19-04.pdf.
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services, service providers often also serve as investment managers by offering their own funds
on the menu. The dual role of administering the plan while managing plan assets may create
opportunities for these companies to favor their own proprietary investment options, even
when more suitable alternatives are available from other fund families.
Service providers are selected by the plan sponsor and their compensation structure is
negotiated along multiple dimensions. The first component of compensation is explicit and
consists of fees collected from the investment options offered on the menu, from sponsors,
or from participants. In practice, most administrative fees are asset-based and are typically
built into the expense ratios paid by participants when investing in the funds offered by the
plan. Whereas service providers can keep the management fees they generate from their own
funds on the menu, they are often compensated by the unaffiliated funds through revenue
sharing arrangements. Under these arrangements they receive a fixed proportion of the to-
tal fees collected by unaffiliated investment management companies.6 Such revenue sharing
arrangements increase the incentives to include unaffiliated investment options in the plan.7
The second component is implicit compensation, which arises from the indirect benefits
that fund families obtain from administering a 401(k) plan. These benefits include the ability
to control the set of affiliated fund options on the menu. In addition, service providers obtain
access to participants and can build a long-term relation with these employees. For example,
such access allows them to motivate plan participants to roll-over their 401(k) assets to an
affiliated Individual Retirement Account (IRA) after they retire or leave their jobs.8
A 2011 Deloitte survey of 401(k) fees finds that negotiations between sponsors and service
6The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2011) documents “revenue-sharing payments from
hundreds of share classes of different investment funds that ranged from 5 to 125 basis points” (pages 16-17).
7Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009), Chalmers and Reuter (2012), Christoffersen, Evans, and
Musto (2013), and Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) discuss biases of advisers and brokers of mutual funds.
8The GAO (2013) report states that “the opportunity for service providers to sell participants their own
retail investment products and services, such as IRAs, may create an incentive for service providers to steer
participants toward the purchase of such products and services even when they may not serve their participants’
best interests” (page 22).
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providers include the number and type of investment options offered on the menu, the choice
of offering proprietary vs. non-proprietary funds, or whether and what type of educational
services may be offered to participants.9 Sponsors may benefit from structuring provider
compensation in the form of asset-based fees in combination with implicit compensation ar-
rangements, if their employees do not recognize the potential conflicts of interest in the 401(k)
plan design. Thus, sponsors may be able to reduce their own costs of administering a plan by
allowing providers to favor their own proprietary investment options on the menus.
There are safeguards to mitigate conflicts of interest in 401(k) plans. In particular, sponsors
face pressure to offer 401(k) plans that satisfy legal and regulatory requirements. Employer-
sponsored 401(k) plans are subject to regulatory and legal constraints imposed by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). ERISA requires that plan fiduciaries act
“solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (...) for the exclusive purpose
of (...) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.” ERISA fiduciary actions are
those involving discretionary plan administration, asset or plan management, or investment
advice. Over the last decade numerous lawsuits have been filed against plan sponsors and
service providers alleging excessive or hidden fees or improper monitoring of options.10
These legal and regulatory constraints and the sponsor’s involvement in the plan’s design
significantly contribute to the prevalence of open architecture 401(k) plans.11 For example,
providers are motivated for legal reasons to outsource funds from unaffiliated families if their
own fund offerings are limited or specialized, as ERISA mandates plans to offer a diversified
menu, or if their own fees are not competitive, as this reduces the risk of costly litigation.
In the rest of the paper, we use an identification strategy that takes advantage of the
9See, www.ici.org/pdf/rpt 11 dc 401k fee study.pdf .
10http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29/chapter-18/subchapter-I/subtitle-B/part-4 details ERISA
rules, which we cite following Muir (2013). The U.S. Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits
Services Administration website includes additional information on fiduciary obligations in DC plans
(http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/fiduciaryresponsibility.html). A discussion of 401(k) lawsuits can be
found in http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204777904576651133452868572.html.
11See Ruiz-Zaiko and Williams (2007) on the effect of growing litigation uncertainty in the industry.
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existence of the open architecture plan design to investigate favoritism in 401(k) plans.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
3.1 Data Collection
We manually collect the investment options offered in 401(k) plans from Form 11-K filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A plan is required to file this form if
it offers the stock of the sponsoring company as an investment option for participants. The
filing provides a description of the plan, identifies the trustee, and lists the accumulated value
of assets invested in the various investment options at the end of the fiscal year. We collect
26,624 links to 11-K filings but restrict this sample to companies covered by COMPUSTAT.
From these documents we collect the tables that describe the “Schedule of Assets.” In
most cases, the table reports the complete set of investment options offered by the plan,
including the employers’ own stock, other common stocks, mutual funds, separate accounts,
or commingled trusts. We supplement our Form 11-K information with plan level data from
Form 5500 filed with the Department of Labor.
We match these data to the CRSP Survivorship Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund database.
Since most plans do not identify the exact share class of the fund offered on the menu, we
establish the link between our 401(k) sample and CRSP at the fund-level. Accordingly, fund
age is calculated as the age of the oldest share class, fund size is the sum of the total net
assets (TNA) of all share classes, and fund returns and expense ratios are calculated as the
TNA weighted average returns and expense ratios of the share classes, respectively. We also
classify each mutual fund as “balanced,” “bond,” “domestic equity,” “international equity,”
or “other.” We create separate dummy variables for money market, target date, and index
funds. We manually group funds into target date and index fund categories based on fund
name. Around 62% of the funds in the average plan in our sample are equity funds and
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20% are bond funds. There is a steady increase in the number of target date funds over our
sample period, especially after the passage of the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, also
documented by Mitchell and Utkus (2012).12
3.2 Sample Description
Table 1 describes the composition of our final sample by year. Our data cover 2,494 distinct
plans sponsored by 1,826 firms from 1998 to 2009.13 Overall, the final dataset has 13,367
plan-year observations. The number of plans is smaller during the early part of the sample as
plan disclosures were generally less comprehensive. Similarly, our data for 2009 are potentially
incomplete as they do not include late filers or filers with a late fiscal year end. Our sample is
representative of the universe of plans offered by public companies filing Form 5500 with the
Department of Labor in terms of plan size, number of participants, and industry composition.14
In our sample, average plan size is approximately $324 million (with a median of $61
million). In 2009, our plans cover around $400 billion in retirement assets and 9 million total
participants. The typical account size is $42,107 and employees contribute $5,303 per year.
The mean (median) percentage of assets invested in employer stock is 17% (10%).
The table also describes information on the structure of the plans. Around 76% of plans
have trustees that are affiliated with mutual fund management companies. The sample has
112 distinct mutual fund trustees with, on average, 70 unique mutual fund trustees per year.
The remaining plans are trusteed by commercial banks, consulting companies, individuals, or
by the sponsoring company itself. We collectively refer to these other entities as “Non-Mutual
Fund Trustees.” Non-mutual fund trustees are generally appointed by smaller plans.
12Following the PPA, the Department of Labor added a new fiduciary protection to ERISA for Qualified
Default Investment Alternatives (QDIA), such as target-date funds, traditional balanced funds, and managed
account advice services.
13When a company sponsors plans with identical menus we retain only the largest plan in order to preserve
the time series continuity required when defining deletions and additions.
14Our sample covers 30-35% of the 401(k) assets of publicly listed companies that report Form 5500.
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To summarize the growing popularity of open architecture, we report three metrics. Trustee
Share represents the average proportion of total plan assets invested in mutual funds offered
by the trustee family. The average trustee share amounts to around one-third in our sample.15
Additionally, we report the average number of management companies that offer at least one
fund on the menu and the Herfindahl index of the menu calculated based on the dollar share
of each of these management companies. These measures point to a decline in the share of
the assets managed by trustee families and an increase in the number of families on the menu.
Indeed, in 1998, 66.4% of mutual fund trusteed menus offered funds from more than one
family, while the corresponding figure is 91.1% in 2009. The table also shows an increase in
the number of funds offered in the average plan over time.
Table 2 describes the characteristics of mutual funds that are kept on, deleted from, or
added to the menu by affiliation. Standard errors of the difference between the mean charac-
teristics of affiliated and unaffiliated funds are clustered at the fund level.16
Our sample contains 134,789 fund-year observations involving funds that stay on the plan
for at least two consecutive years, 18,474 fund deletions, and 29,688 fund additions. Thus,
the unconditional probability for a fund deletion is around 12% per year. On average, each
deleted affiliated (unaffiliated) fund accounts for 7.19% (7.60%) of plan assets. About 11.35%
(14.57%) of all affiliated (unaffiliated) assets on the menu are deleted each year. By the end
of the calendar year, affiliated and unaffiliated funds that are added to the menu during the
year represent 14.35% and 20.74% of plan assets, respectively.17
Overall, funds that are deleted have the lowest average performance across the three groups,
15The average trustee share appears, at first glance, to be relatively low. However, this figure includes all
plans in our sample, regardless of trustee type. Overall, 47.1% of our plans do not include affiliated funds.
Trustee share amounts to 62.4% if we condition on plans that include at least one affiliated fund.
16We include plan years in which a trustee change occurs in our sample and in the analyses reported in the
paper. Our results are robust to excluding these plan years, as shown in Table A-5 in the Internet Appendix.
17Simultaneous deletions and additions are fairly common. In our sample, in 40.5% of the plan years the
menu does not change, in 6.1% (17.1%) of the plan years we see fund exits (entries) but no entries (exits), and
in the remaining 36.3% of the cases both entries and exits occur simultaneously.
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as measured by their percentile performance among funds of the same style in the CRSP fund
universe using the past three-year returns.18 Added funds are younger and come with better
performance records than those that are kept or deleted.
The table also shows that affiliated funds tend to have lower expense ratios, lower turnover,
and lower standard deviations of monthly returns. These differences occur as affiliated funds
are more likely to be more basic investment options (such as standard domestic equity funds
or passively-managed index funds), whereas unaffiliated funds are more likely to be specialized
funds (such as international or sector funds). For example, approximately 13% of the affiliated
funds in our sample are passively-managed index funds compared to 6% of unaffiliated funds.
One reason why service providers outsource more specialized funds is that they may not offer
these investment options in their own product lineup. Nonetheless, the results in the table
may point to a potential benefit of offering affiliated mutual fund options. These explicit
benefits may come as a result of increased implicit costs however, as described earlier. We
next investigate the costs associated with including affiliated investment options on the menu.
4 Menu Changes
Investment allocations in 401(k) accounts are driven by the plan sponsor, the service providers,
and plan participants. In a first step, service providers along with the sponsor select the menu
of investment options for the plan. In a second step, participants allocate their retirement
savings and contributions across these options. To ensure that the plan continuously offers a
suitable set of investment choices, 401(k) plans dynamically adjust their menus by deleting
some investment options and adding others. In this section, we study these menu altering de-
cisions to test whether mutual funds affiliated with the plan’s trustee are treated preferentially
relative to funds from other mutual fund companies.
18The style categories are: “balanced,” “bond,” “domestic equity,” “international equity,” or “other.”
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4.1 Univariate Analysis of Fund Deletions
We first provide univariate analyses to investigate whether the propensity to delete a fund from
the menu depends on whether the fund is affiliated with the trustee. To make the comparison
between the deletion frequencies of affiliated and unaffiliated funds more meaningful, we also
group funds into deciles based on past performance. In particular, we compute the percentile
performance of each fund among funds of the same style in the CRSP fund universe.
Figure 1 reports mean annual deletion frequencies by trustee affiliation for each perfor-
mance decile using the prior 36 months to evaluate performance. We construct the figure by
first computing the deletion rates of each fund each year in affiliated and unaffiliated plans.
We then average these rates within the performance deciles by year. Finally, we average the
decile deletion rates across time. Panel A shows these averages using our entire sample.19
Panel B only includes those funds that contemporaneously appear on multiple 401(k) menus,
at least once as an affiliated fund and at least once as an unaffiliated fund. By comparing the
deletion probabilities of the same fund across plans managed by different trustees, our results
are not contaminated by different fund characteristics or performance records.
The figure shows that affiliated funds are less likely to be deleted from a 401(k) plan than
unaffiliated funds regardless of past performance. Furthermore, the difference in deletion rates
widens significantly for poorly-performing funds. For example, funds in the lowest performance
decile in Panel A have a probability of deletion of 25.5% for unaffiliated funds and a probability
of deletion of only 13.7% for affiliated funds. Indeed the deletion rate of affiliated funds in the
lowest performance decile is actually lower than the deletion rates of affiliated funds in deciles
two through four. This is surprising provided that Carhart (1997) documents performance
persistence among poorly-performing funds. On the other hand, we find that in the top decile,
19The number of observations in the individual performance deciles ranges between 407 and 867 for affiliated
funds and 1,056 and 2,522 for unaffiliated funds. We report tests of the statistical significance of the differences
across the groups in Table A-1 in the Internet Appendix.
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affiliated funds are almost as likely to be deleted as unaffiliated funds.
Overall, the difference in deletion rates between affiliated and unaffiliated funds is statis-
tically significant for the nine lowest performance deciles. In addition, the difference between
affiliated and unaffiliated deletion probabilities in the lowest decile is statistically significantly
higher than the corresponding differences in each of the other nine deciles. Panel A of Table
A-1 in the Internet Appendix tabulates the deletion frequencies for affiliated and unaffiliated
funds, as well as the difference between them using the entire sample. In addition to the
three-year performance evaluation horizon depicted in Figure 1, it also reports results for
performance ranks based on prior one and five years.
Panel B shows similar results for the subsample of funds that are simultaneously offered as
both affiliated and unaffiliated funds.20 In this analysis the funds in each decile are identical
across the affiliated and unaffiliated groups. Thus, our results are not driven by differences in
fund characteristics.
Service providers have an incentive to protect their poorly-performing affiliated funds, as
many of these funds are experiencing outflows from other investors. For example, we find that
investor money flows of affiliated funds from their non-retirement clients equal -3.5% in decile
1 and 22.8% in decile 10.21 Fund families therefore can reduce the volatility of fund flows by
keeping those affiliated funds on the menu that experience large outflows.
Finally, the deletion of an affiliated fund does not imply that the number of affiliated funds
offered on the menu decreases. Although we do not observe where the assets of deleted funds
are transferred, we find that plans often offer new affiliated funds when other affiliated funds
20In both panels, standard errors are clustered at the fund level. For additional robustness, Panels C and
D in Table A-1 report the corresponding deletion frequencies using the Fama-MacBeth methodology with
Newey-West standard errors.
21We compute investor money flows for DC and non-DC investors following Sialm, Starks, and Zhang
(2015) using information collected from surveys conducted by Pensions & Investments. Money flow by non-DC
investors is computed as [NonDCAssetsf,t−NonDCAssetsf,t−1×(1+Rf,t)]/[NonDCAssetsf,t−1×(1+Rf,t)],
where Rf,t is the return of fund f in year t and NonDCAssetsf,t represents assets under management from
the fund’s non-DC clients. We winsorize these money flows at the 95% level.
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are deleted. For example, if a plan deletes one or more affiliated funds, then there is a 95.7%
probability that at least one new affiliated fund is added during the same year. On the other
hand, if one or more unaffiliated funds are deleted, then there is only a 43.2% probability that
at least one other fund is added from the deleted fund’s family. Of course, Trustee Share may
still decline over time if additional families enter the menu, as indicated in Table 1.
These univariate results provide evidence that service providers favor their own funds when
they adjust the investment menu. Favoritism is particularly pronounced for those funds that
experience poor recent performance.
4.2 Binary Choice Models of Fund Deletions
To extend our univariate results in Section 4.1, we examine the performance sensitivity of
fund deletions using the following logit model:
Prob(DELp,f,t = 1) = Λ(AFp,f,t−1βAF + RTf ,t−1βR +AFp,f,t−1R
T
f ,t−1βAF×R + Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ), (1)
where DELp,f,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if mutual fund f is deleted
from plan p during year t and zero otherwise, AFp,f,t−1 is an indicator variable for whether the
trustee of pension plan p is affiliated with the management company of mutual fund f at the
end of year t − 1, Rf ,t−1 is a vector that captures piecewise-linear performance segments of
fund f over the prior three years, and Zp,f ,t−1 is a vector of lagged control variables including
time fixed effects and style fixed effects. The function Λ(z) in the logit model is defined as
Λ(z) = exp(z)/(1 + exp(z)) and ranges between 0 and 1. Favoritism toward affiliated funds
implies that, all else equal, affiliated funds are less likely to be delisted (i.e., βAF < 0) and that
deletions are less sensitive to prior performance for affiliated funds (i.e., |βR+βAF×R| < |βR|).
We use three different specifications for the prior performance measure Rf ,t−1. The first
specification (‘linear model’) relates deletion rates to the performance percentile of funds.
Performance percentiles Perf are formed based on the performance of each fund among
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funds of the same style in the CRSP fund universe and range between zero and one. The
second specification (‘two-segment model’) evaluates deletion sensitivities to prior perfor-
mance separately for below and above median funds. LowPerf and HighPerf are defined as
LowPerfp,f,t−1 = min(Perfp,f,t−1, 0.5) and HighPerfp,f,t−1 = max(Perfp,f,t−1 − 0.5, 0). Fi-
nally, the third specification (‘three-segment model’) uses quintile-based performance segments
following Sirri and Tufano (1998). The sensitivity of deletions to performance is estimated
separately for the lowest performance quintile (LowPerfp,f,t−1 = min(Perfp,f,t−1, 0.2)), the
middle three performance quintiles (MidPerfp,f,t−1 = min(max(Perfp,f,t−1 − 0.2, 0), 0.6)),
and the highest performance quintile (HighPerfp,f,t−1 = max(Perfp,f,t−1 − 0.8, 0)).
To control for potential redundancies among menu options, which may lead to fund dele-
tions, we add an explanatory variable MaximumCorr, which captures the highest pairwise
correlation between the returns of each option and those of all other mutual fund investment
choices on the menu. The other control variables in Zp,f ,t−1 include the natural logarithm
of plan assets invested in the fund, the number of options offered on the menu, the expense
ratio of the fund, the turnover of the fund, the natural logarithm of the fund’s size, fund age,
the standard deviation of the fund’s return, and unreported indicator variables for specific
fund types (e.g., domestic equity, international equity, balanced, bond, target date, index,
and money market funds) and year fixed effects.
Table 3 reports logit coefficient estimates for the various specifications.22 Consistent with
Figure 1, we find that deletion probabilities differ significantly between affiliated and unaffili-
ated funds. In all specifications the coefficient estimates of our Affiliated dummy are signifi-
cantly negative at the 1% level. We also find that the performance sensitivity of deletions is
generally muted for affiliated funds. To interpret the coefficient estimates, we can compute
22We use the logit model because odds ratios from this setup represent the appropriate framework for
interpreting the estimated effects for additions, as we discuss below. For deletions, it is also useful to look at
marginal effects however. The Internet Appendix therefore provides results using the linear probability setup,
which allows for a straightforward interpretation of the marginal effects of the interactions. These estimates
are consistent with the INTEFF adjustments in non-linear models as suggested by Ai and Norton (2003).
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the odds ratio for deletions between affiliated and unaffiliated funds. The first specification
implies that the odds of being deleted for a median-performing affiliated fund are 63% of the
corresponding odds for an unaffiliated median-performer. Furthermore, the difference in dele-
tion odds between affiliated and unaffiliated funds widens substantially for poorly-performing
funds: The deletion odds for an affiliated fund in the worst (best) performance percentile
equal 47% (84%) of the deletion odds for a corresponding unaffiliated fund.23
An alternative way to illustrate the differential sensitivity of deletions to prior performance
for affiliated and unaffiliated funds can be obtained by comparing the deletion odds of the
worst and the best performing funds. For example, the odds of being deleted for a worst-
performing affiliated fund (Perf = 0) are 2.89 times larger than that for a best-performing
affiliated fund (Perf = 1). In contrast, the odds of being deleted differ by a factor of 5.16
between the worst- and the best-performing unaffiliated funds.24 Thus, deletion rates are more
sensitive to performance for unaffiliated than for affiliated funds.
The results from the two- and three-segment performance specifications are consistent with
the linear specifications. The impact of performance on deletion probabilities is significantly
lower for affiliated funds. Figure A-1 in the Internet Appendix summarizes the fitted deletion
probabilities of the models at different performance levels. We calculate these predicted values
by evaluating the probabilities at the means of the control variables.
The additional control variables indicate that funds with returns that are more correlated
23In the linear performance model, the odds of being deleted for a fund are odds = p/(1−p) = exp(βAFAF+
βRPerf + βAF×RAF × Perf + ZTp,f ,t−1βZ), where p denotes the probability of deletion. The odds ratio
between affiliated and unaffiliated funds with identical control variables Z equals OR = exp(βAF + βRPerf +
βAF×RPerf+ZTp,f ,t−1βZ)/exp(βRPerf+Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ) = exp(βAF+βAF×RPerf). Thus, the odds ratio between
affiliated and unaffiliated funds equals exp(βAF ) = exp(−0.76) = 0.47 for funds with Perf = 0, exp(βAF +
βAF×R × 0.5) = exp(−0.76 + 0.58 × 0.5) = 0.63 for funds with Perf = 0.5, and exp(βAF + βAF×R × 1) =
exp(−0.76 + 0.58) = 0.84 for funds with Perf = 1.
24The odds ratio between a worst-performing fund (Perf = 0) and a best-performing fund (Perf = 1) with
identical control variables Z equals OR = exp(βAF + Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ)/exp(βAF + βR + βAF×R + Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ) =
1/exp(βR + βAF×R) = 1/exp(−1.64 + 0.58) = 2.89 for affiliated funds and OR = exp(ZTp,f ,t−1βZ)/exp(βR +
ZTp,f ,t−1βZ) = 1/exp(βR) = 1/exp(−1.64) = 5.16 for unaffiliated funds.
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with those of other options on the menu are more likely to be deleted. Thus, the incumbent
ensemble of the funds on the menu matters in deletion decisions. Additionally, funds with
large plan investments are less likely to be deleted and plans with more investment options
are less likely to delete a specific fund. Plan providers are also more likely to delete funds with
high expense ratios, funds with high turnover, and smaller funds. Table A-2 in the Internet
Appendix reports the corresponding OLS coefficient estimates from a linear probability model.
We provide further evidence on the trustee’s incentive to support distressed funds in the
Internet Appendix using non-DC money flows. In particular, we create an indicator variable
that equals one if the fund experiences an outflow from its non-DC clients in the past year
and zero otherwise, and an interaction term of this indicator variable with our Affiliated
dummy based on footnote 21 above. Panel A of Table A-3 reports the results of adding
these two additional explanatory variables to the models in Table 3, while Panel B shows the
corresponding linear probability estimates. The coefficient estimates on NonDC Flow < 0
are positive and highly significant suggesting that plans are more likely to delete those funds
that are also shunned by outside investors. This implies that NonDC Flow < 0 captures some
aspects of the fund’s popularity among investors that are not captured by past performance or
other fund characteristics. Interestingly, the interaction term is negative, although not always
significantly so, indicating that affiliated funds receive support when they experience money
outflows from their non-DC clients.
Overall, our baseline results indicate that affiliated funds are significantly less likely to be
deleted from 401(k) plans than unaffiliated funds and that this bias is particularly pronounced
for poorly-performing funds. As we discuss in Section 4.1 above, protecting poorly-performing
affiliated funds may be especially important as keeping these funds on the menu dampens the
outflow of capital triggered by poor performance and, as a result, mitigates distress.
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4.3 Subsample Analysis of Fund Deletions
To analyze whether the incentives for fund deletions differ across different types of plans and
across time, Table 4 shows the results of our logit model specified in equation (1) for various
subsamples. The corresponding OLS coefficients from the linear probability estimation are
tabulated in Table A-4 in the Internet Appendix.
In the first two columns, we compare the results for the three largest trustees and for
all other trustees. The three largest trustees in our sample each manage over 10% of all
401(k) mutual fund assets.25 Large service providers have more in-house investment options
and may have more bargaining power relative to small service providers. We find that the
coefficient estimates on Affiliated are negative and statistically significant across both groups
of trustees indicating that the odds of being deleted are significantly higher for unaffiliated
funds. Additionally, the coefficients of the interaction between LowPerf and Affiliated are
positive for both groups, but only statistically significant for smaller trustees.
To test whether our results are affected by economies of scale in plan management, we re-
estimate our model in columns 3 and 4 for below- and above-median sized plans, respectively.
Sponsors with large 401(k) plans may have more negotiating power with service providers
and may also monitor service providers more effectively. The results reveal that the odds
of being deleted are significantly higher for unaffiliated funds across both groups of trustees.
However, while the coefficient estimates of the interaction between LowPerf and Affiliated
are positive and significant for both groups, the overall performance sensitivity of poorly-
performing affiliated funds is indeed more muted in smaller plans.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) introduced comprehensive new legislation to
protect U.S. retirement plan participants. Although the reforms mainly concerned defined
benefit plans, the PPA also affected DC plans by allowing companies to offer objective invest-
25These are Vanguard, Fidelity, and State Street in our sample.
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ment advice to participants and by requiring plans to provide specific benefit statements to
participants.26 Furthermore, several class action lawsuits were filed in the mid 2000s against
large employers for breaches of fiduciary obligations with respect to their 401(k) accounts.27
To investigate whether these lawsuits and regulatory reforms affect our results, we divide our
sample into two subperiods (1998-2006 and 2007-2009). Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 indicate
that the type of favoritism has changed over the time. Whereas service providers strongly
favor their own funds across all performance groups in the first subsample, they favor only
poorly-performing funds in the second subsample.28
We provide additional robustness analyses on fund deletions in Table A-5 in the Internet
Appendix. For example, we show that the results are qualitatively unaffected if we include
trustee fixed effects or fund fixed effects. Furthermore, the results are also robust if we focus
only on plans with mutual fund trustees or if we delete target-date funds or plan-years in
which a trustee change occurs.
4.4 Univariate Analysis of Fund Additions
The previous sections provide evidence that trustees are substantially less likely to delete their
own funds from the menus, and even more so when these funds are poorly-performing. In this
section we examine whether similar biases exist for fund additions as well.
To investigate how a fund’s propensity to be added to a menu depends on its affiliation with
the trustee, we determine the addition frequency of each fund in the CRSP fund universe as
an affiliated and unaffiliated menu choice, respectively. Consistent with our deletion frequency
measures in Section 4.1, we define the affiliated addition frequency of a fund as the number
26Details on the PPA can be obtained from http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pensionreform.html.
27See Ruiz-Zaiko and Williams (2007) for additional information on the lawsuits.
28The odds ratio for deletions between affiliated and unaffiliated funds is 48% (52%) during 1998-2006
(2007-2009) for the worst-performing funds (LowPerf = 0 and HighPerf = 0). The corresponding odds
ratios equal 53% in 1998-2006 and 91% in 2007-2009 for median-performing funds (LowPerf = 0.5 and
HighPerf = 0). Finally, the odds ratios for deletions between affiliated and unaffiliated are 50% in 1998-2006
and 94% in 2007-2009 for the best-performing funds (LowPerf = 0.5 and HighPerf = 0.5).
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of affiliated plans to which the fund is added as a new investment option during the year
divided by the total number of affiliated menus to which it could be added (i.e., the number of
affiliated plans in which the fund is not already offered as an option at the end of the previous
year). Unaffiliated addition frequencies are defined analogously.
Figure 2 displays average addition frequencies by affiliation and performance. Panel A
summarizes the results using all existing mutual funds in the CRSP fund universe, whereas
the average frequencies in Panel B are based on funds from only those families that act as
trustees for at least one of our 401(k) plans during the year. Since addition rates differ
substantially across affiliated and unaffiliated funds, we include separate axes for the two
addition rates.
We find that the difference between the addition frequencies of affiliated and unaffiliated
funds is large. For example, in the overall sample, the average addition frequency is 1.33% for
affiliated funds and just 0.02% for unaffiliated funds. Though the difference between the groups
is stark, it is difficult to assess the magnitude of favoritism for additions from these statistics
alone. This is because when calculating these addition frequencies we implicitly assume that
plan sponsors and trustees consider every fund in the CRSP universe when selecting new
choices for their menus.29 Therefore, it is important to focus instead on relative, rather than
absolute, differences in performance sensitivities across affiliated and unaffiliated funds.
Figure 2 and the corresponding values in Table A-6 show that while addition probabilities
increase with performance for both groups, they increase disproportionately more for unaffili-
ated funds than for affiliated funds, indicating that unaffiliated additions are more sensitive to
performance. An improvement in performance from the lowest to the highest decile increases
the addition probability for unaffiliated funds approximately nine-fold from 0.005% to 0.044%.
At the same time, an equivalent improvement in performance for affiliated funds results in
29The difference in addition frequencies is similarly stark when we limit our analysis to only those investment
styles in the CRSP universe that appear on 401(k) menus in our sample.
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only a three times larger addition rate (from 0.747% to 2.255%).
4.5 Binary Choice Models of Fund Additions
In this section we extend the univariate results by estimating logit models that are analogous
to those we use to analyze fund deletions in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 above:
Prob(ADDp,f,t = 1) = Λ(AFp,f,t−1βAF + RTf ,t−1βR +AFp,f,t−1R
T
f ,t−1βAF×R + Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ), (2)
where ADDp,f,t is one if fund f is added to plan p at time t and zero otherwise. We include
the same controls in Zp,f ,t−1 as in equation (1) with the exception that one of the variables
– the natural logarithm of plan assets invested in the fund – is not defined for additions. As
before, we estimate a linear, a two-segment, and a three-segment model. Since we take each
fund in the CRSP fund universe at each time t and ask whether it is added to each existing
plan p, the sample for estimating equation (2) includes over 60 million observations.
The logit framework is especially helpful for the analysis of additions as the addition rates
of affiliated funds are orders-of-magnitude higher than those of unaffiliated funds, as discussed
above. Due to the large difference in baseline probabilities, estimated marginal effects (which
measure absolute effects) are not suitable for comparing the performance sensitivities of addi-
tions across affiliated and unaffiliated funds. In contrast, odds ratios provide more meaningful
comparisons as these are ratios of scaled probabilities: by construction, scaling takes away the
level effect and allows us to focus on the conditional results (relative effects).
Table 5 reports logit coefficient estimates for the linear performance model, our baseline
two-segment, and the Sirri and Tufano (1998) three-segment specifications, respectively. Each
model is estimated with and without the additional controls captured by Zp,f ,t−1. Consistent
with Figure 2 the results in the table indicate that affiliated funds are significantly more likely
to be added to 401(k) menus. In all specifications the coefficient estimates of our Affiliated
dummy variable are positive and significant at the 1% level. In addition, performance sensi-
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tivities are significantly smaller for affiliated funds. For example, column 1 suggests that the
addition odds for the best-performing affiliated funds are 3.4 times (exp(1.99− 0.78)) higher
than the addition odds for the worst-performing affiliated funds, whereas the addition odds
for the best-performing unaffiliated funds are 7.3 times (exp(1.99)) higher than the addition
odds for the worst-performing unaffiliated funds. Thus, unaffiliated funds do not just have
lower addition rates, they also have addition rates that are more sensitive to performance.
Figure A-2 in the Internet Appendix displays predicted probabilities from our logit model for
fund additions based on Table 5. We calculate these predicted probabilities by evaluating
them at the means of the various control variables.
Table 6 shows our estimates for the subsamples outlined in Section 4.3. Consistent with
our deletion results, we find that the odds of being added to a 401(k) plan are significantly
higher for affiliated funds for each subgroup. We also find that the performance sensitivity
of affiliated funds is lower than that of unaffiliated funds among below-median performers,
however not statistically significantly so for larger plans and after 2006. Table A-7 in the
Internet Appendix provides additional robustness results based on alternative specifications
and subsamples. Finally, we report additional evidence on the characteristics of affiliated and
unaffiliated funds based on our sample of newly added funds in Table A-8.
Overall, our results for both deletion and addition decisions provide evidence that trustees
treat their own affiliated funds differently than unaffiliated funds. Affiliated funds are more
likely to be added and are less likely to be deleted from a plan. Furthermore, fund additions
and deletions are less sensitive to prior performance for affiliated than for unaffiliated funds.
5 Participant Flows
While the investment opportunity set of the plan is determined by the menu selected by the
employer and the service providers, participants can freely allocate their contributions within
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the opportunity set. They could offset favoritism in their own portfolios by, for instance,
not allocating capital to poorly-performing affiliated funds. In this section, we investigate
whether menu favoritism has an impact on the overall allocation of plan assets by examining
the sensitivity of participant flows to the performance of affiliated and unaffiliated funds.
Our primary definition of the growth rate of new money of fund f held in 401(k) plan p
at time t is based on the following measure of fund flows:
NMG1p,f,t =
Vp,f,t − Vp,f,t−1(1 +Rf,t)
Vp,f,t−1(1 +Rf,t)
. (3)
The numerator captures the dollar change in the value of participants’ investments (Vp,f,t)
in fund f in plan p in year t after adjusting for the appreciation of plan assets Rf,t (fund
return) during the year. The denominator is defined as the projected value of the lagged plan
position in the fund without any new flow of money. If an investment option is deleted from
a menu, then NMG1 equals -100%. We winsorize NMG1 at the 95% level.30
Since equation (3) is not defined for fund additions, we adopt two alternative measures for
the growth rate of new money. Our second measure (NMG2) normalizes fund flows by the
sum of beginning- and end-of-period assets:
NMG2p,f,t =
Vp,f,t − Vp,f,t−1(1 +Rf,t)
Vp,f,t + Vp,f,t−1(1 +Rf,t)
. (4)
Under this definition, new money growth takes a value in the interval [-1,1]. In particular,
it equals -100% for deletions, as before, and +100% for a fund that is newly added to the
employee benefit plan. More gradual inflows and outflows (i.e., participant flows) into the
fund are represented by intermediate values.
Finally, the denominator of our third measure (NMG3) is based on overall plan value at
t− 1 adjusted for fund returns. To remove outliers, we winsorize NMG3 at the 95% level:
NMG3p,f,t =
Vp,f,t − Vp,f,t−1(1 +Rf,t)∑
f Vp,f,t−1(1 +Rf,t)
. (5)
30Figure A-4 in the Appendix depicts histograms of the percentage flows.
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These three definitions of new money growth allow us to decompose fund flows to menu
options into components that are primarily driven by plan providers (i.e., flows due to fund
additions and deletions) and components that are primarily driven by plan participants (i.e.,
all changes which are not driven by fund additions and deletions).31
To investigate the sensitivity of fund flows to prior performance, we estimate the following
regression using the three alternative definitions of NMG:
NMGp,f,t = AFp,f,t−1βAF + RTf ,t−1βR + AFp,f,t−1R
T
f ,t−1βAF×R
+ ZTp,f ,t−1βZ + p,f,t. (6)
Equation (6) is analogous to our two-segment baseline equation with two exceptions. First,
our new dependent variable is NMG, a continuous variable under all three definitions. Second,
if participants use the same allocation rule each year, growth occurs mechanically due to the
additional money contributed to the accounts over time. To capture this mechanical feature
of flows, we add contemporaneous plan growth as an additional control.32
The results are summarized in Table 7. The first three columns show estimates for our full
sample of NMG values. The full sample includes observations that capture menu changes as
well as observations that reflect more gradual inflows and outflows by plan participants. The
last three columns report estimates for participant flows based on a subsample that excludes
NMG observations that reflect fund additions and deletions.
The results in columns 1–3 using the full sample are consistent with the results from Sec-
tion 4. Affiliated funds attract more new money than unaffiliated funds. We find that flows
into various plan options increase with prior fund performance, consistent with Chevalier and
31Plan sponsors and service providers may not only affect flows through addition and deletion decisions.
For example, the selection of default options, the freezing of existing options, and the promotion of specific
investments during online or face-to-face educational activities are additional actions that affect money flows.
Unfortunately, we do not observe these decisions. However, despite our narrow definition of menu changes
initiated by plan sponsors and service providers (based on flows due to additions and deletions), we find that
plan sponsors and providers account for most of the variability of fund flows, as documented in Table 7.
32We calculate plan growth using information from Form 5500.
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Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007). The interaction
effects indicate that flows are significantly less sensitive to poor performance for affiliated
funds. For example, a ten percentage point increase in the past performance percentile of
below-median funds increases flows by 5.5% for unaffiliated funds and by only 0.8% for af-
filiated funds in column 1. The additional controls indicate that the growth rates are larger
for plans with higher growth rates, for funds that exhibit low return correlations with other
menu options, for smaller options, for funds with lower expense ratios and turnovers, and for
larger funds.
To investigate the importance of participant flows, we restrict our attention to the money
flows of options that are not driven by deletions or additions in the last three columns of
Table 7. We find that participant flows are generally higher for affiliated funds, although the
coefficient estimates are smaller than the corresponding estimates in the first three columns
of the table. Thus, the higher overall flows to affiliated funds in columns 1–3 are primarily
driven by the decisions of plan sponsors and service providers.
The coefficients on the two performance ranking segments indicate that participants chase
prior fund performance. Comparing the coefficients in columns 4–6 to those in columns 1–3
reveals that most of the inflows into above-median performers are due to plan participants,
whereas most of the outflows out of below-median performers are due to decisions by sponsors
and service providers. The interaction effects between the affiliation dummy and the two per-
formance segments indicate that plan participants do not offset the biased decisions of plan
sponsors and trustees: if anything, they are also somewhat less sensitive to the performance
of poorly-performing affiliated funds. These results are consistent with previous studies doc-
umenting that DC pension participants are naive and inactive (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001;
Madrian and Shea, 2001; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003).
Our results show that decisions of plan sponsors and service providers have a substantial
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impact on flows to mutual funds. Affiliated mutual funds can benefit by obtaining higher
money flows and by avoiding large outflows from their poorly-performing funds.
6 Future Performance
Our previous results provide evidence that 401(k) plans are less likely to delete affiliated
funds from their menus and that deletions of affiliated funds are less sensitive to prior fund
performance. We also document a similar behavior for fund additions. Finally, we show that
participants do not direct flows away from the biased options offered by the trustee.
Still, favoritism toward affiliated funds may not hurt plan participants if the underperform-
ing affiliated funds exhibit superior subsequent performance. Indeed service providers may
keep poor performers not because they are biased toward them, but rather, due to positive
information they possess about the future returns of their own funds.
To investigate this hypothesis, we examine the performance of affiliated and unaffiliated
funds that are kept in, deleted from, or added to the plans using monthly fund returns. We
restrict our sample to domestic equity funds in these analyses, since it is difficult to compare
performance across different asset classes. At the end of each calendar year, we form equal-
weighted portfolios of affiliated and unaffiliated funds separately based on whether the funds
are kept, deleted, or added (“No Changes,” “Deletions,”and “Additions”) during the year.33
This creates six portfolios (“All Funds”). We then further subdivide these six groups based on
past performance, using performance percentiles based on the prior three years. For example,
“Affiliated Funds/Deletions/Lowest Decile” represents the portfolio of affiliated funds in the
worst performance decile that are deleted from a menu. We rebalance our portfolios at the
end of each calendar year and calculate the portfolios’ return for each of the next 12 months
keeping the portfolio composition fixed.
33To avoid any look-ahead biases, we do not include those plans in these analyses that have fiscal years
ending before July of the calendar year.
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Table 8 reports the abnormal returns of the various portfolios. Panels A, B, and C re-
port the Carhart (1997) alphas, the Fama and French (1993) alphas, and the CAPM alphas,
respectively. The future Carhart alpha for affiliated funds kept for at least two consecutive
periods in the 401(k) plan is essentially zero basis point (bps) per month. Similarly, the
corresponding alpha for unaffiliated funds is insignificantly different from zero at -6 bps per
month. Consistent with the evidence on defined benefit plans provided by Goyal and Wahal
(2008), we do not find that added funds on average perform significantly better than deleted
funds. However, we find that affiliated funds that are kept in the 401(k) plans by their spon-
sors despite their poor performance exhibit significantly negative Carhart and Fama-French
alphas. For example, affiliated funds ranked in the lowest performance decile over the prior
three years exhibit a Carhart alpha of -0.33% per month. This represents a risk- and style-
adjusted underperformance of 3.96% per year. The performance difference between affiliated
and unaffiliated funds ranked in the lowest performance decile of 0.25% per month is also
statistically significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, the results are less pronounced
using CAPM alphas, which do not adjust for style effects, but the difference in performance
between poorly-performing affiliated and unaffiliated funds that are retained on the plans is
similarly large.
Our results in Table 8 confirm that the decision to retain poorly-performing affiliated
funds is not driven by information about the future performance of these funds. Instead,
consistent with Carhart (1997), poor performance persists, even after adjusting for momen-
tum factors. Overall, those plan participants who invest in these affiliated funds would have
obtained a higher risk-adjusted performance had they switched their retirement savings from
underperforming affiliated funds to other funds.
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7 Conclusion
While service providers of 401(k) plans are expected to act in the best interest of participants,
they also have a competing incentive to attract and retain retirement contributions in their
own proprietary funds. Despite the increasing role of 401(k) plans as a retirement vehicle,
little is known about how provider incentives influence the set of investment choices offered
in the plans. This is surprising as small inefficiencies in the selection of investments options,
especially early in the participants’ career, can have a significant impact on retirement savings
outcomes.
Our paper takes a first step to investigate this question. We document significant favoritism
in 401(k) menu decisions. We show that affiliated funds are less likely to be removed from the
menu relative to unaffiliated funds, independent of their performance record. Moreover, the
difference in deletion propensities between affiliated and unaffiliated funds is largest among
the worst performing funds. We find similar results for mutual fund additions.
Interestingly, mutual fund affiliation does not affect how participants allocate their con-
tributions, suggesting that participants do not offset these biases. We also show that the
reluctance to remove poorly-performing affiliated funds from the menu generates a significant
subsequent negative abnormal return for participants investing in those funds.
In sum, our paper provides a first look at service providers in the 401(k) industry and
their effect on plan design. Future research should explore and contrast additional costs and
benefits of the various administrative arrangements of 401(k) plans.
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Figure 1: Fund Deletions by Affiliation.
The figure depicts mean annual fund deletion frequencies by trustee affiliation and performance deciles. Panel A
includes the full sample. Panel B includes the subsample of funds that contemporaneously appear on multiple
401(k) menus, at least once as an affiliated fund and at least once as an unffiliated fund. Every year, we calculate
the ratio of the number of affiliated (unaffiliated) menus from which the fund is delisted during the year to the
total number of affiliated (unaffiliated) menus associated with the fund. Performance deciles are created by
grouping funds based on their percentile performance among funds of the same style in the CRSP fund universe
over the prior three years. We then average across the funds’ deletion frequencies by performance and affiliation.
Table A-1 in the Internet Appendix tabulates the corresponding values and also shows the difference in the mean
deletion rates.
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Figure 2: Fund Additions by Affiliation.
The figure depicts mean annual fund addition frequencies by affiliation and performance deciles. Affiliated
probabilities are depicted relative to the axis on the left, while the corresponding axis for unaffiliated funds is
on the right side of the figure. Panel A includes the full sample. Panel B includes only those funds that are
offered by fund families that serve as trustees for at least one plan in our sample. For each fund in the CRSP
mutual fund universe, every year we calculate the ratio of the number of affiliated (unaffiliated) menus to which
the fund is added during the year to the total number of affiliated (unaffiliated) menus that do not yet include
the fund as an option. Performance deciles are created by grouping funds based on their percentile performance
among funds of the same style in the CRSP fund universe over the prior three years. We then average across the
funds’ addition frequencies by performance and affiliation. The corresponding values and differences in mean
addition rates between affiliated and unaffiliated funds are tabulated in Table A-6 in the Internet Appendix.
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Table 3: Logit Model of Fund Deletions.
The table reports the coefficient estimates for the following logit model: Prob(DELp,f,t = 1) =
Λ(AFp,f,t−1βAF + RTf ,t−1βR + AFp,f,t−1R
T
f ,t−1βAF×R + Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ), where DELp,f,t is an indicator vari-
able that takes the value of one if mutual fund f is deleted from plan p during year t and zero otherwise,
AFp,f,t−1 is an indicator for whether the trustee of plan p is affiliated with the management company of fund
f at the end of year t− 1, and Rf ,t−1 is a vector that captures piecewise-linear performance segments of fund
f . Performance percentiles Perf are formed based on the performance of each fund among funds of the same
style in the CRSP fund universe and range between zero and one. We include a linear performance speci-
fication, a two-segment specification where LowPerfp,f,t−1 = min(Perfp,f,t−1, 0.5) and HighPerfp,f,t−1 =
max(Perfp,f,t−1 − 0.5, 0), and a three-segment specification where LowPerfp,f,t−1 = min(Perfp,f,t−1, 0.2),
MidPerfp,f,t−1 = min(max(Perfp,f,t−1−0.2, 0), 0.6), and HighPerfp,f,t−1 = max(Perfp,f,t−1−0.8, 0). The
other lagged control variables in vector Z include the maximum return correlation of the fund with existing
menu options, the natural logarithm of option size, the number of options, the expense ratio, fund turnover,
the natural logarithm of the fund’s size, fund age, the standard deviation of the fund’s return, and fund
style and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Linear Model Two-Segment Model Three-Segment Model
Affiliated −0.76∗∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗ −0.70∗∗∗ −0.82∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14)
Perf −1.64∗∗∗ −1.11∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)
Perf×Aﬄiated 0.58∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
LowPerf −2.26∗∗∗ −1.82∗∗∗ −2.39∗∗∗ −2.06∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.35) (0.39)
LowPerf×Affiliated 0.45∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.40 1.48∗∗
(0.20) (0.22) (0.66) (0.75)
Midperf −1.82∗∗∗ −1.34∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08)
MidPerf×Affiliated 0.50∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(0.14) (0.15)
HighPerf −1.06∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ 0.56 1.72∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.11) (0.42) (0.37)
HighPerf×Affiliated 0.67∗∗∗ −0.10 1.43∗ −0.62
(0.21) (0.22) (0.78) (0.80)
Maximum Corr 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Option Size) −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of Options −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exp. Ratio 0.61∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Turnover 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Fund Size) −0.15∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Fund Age 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Std. Dev. −0.18 −0.82 −0.89
(1.06) (1.04) (1.01)
Observations 167,952 106,848 167,952 106,848 167,952 106,848
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Table 4: Logit Model for Fund Deletions: Subsample Analysis.
The table reports the coefficient estimates for the following logit model: Prob(DELp,f,t = 1) =
Λ(AFp,f,t−1βAF + RTf ,t−1βR + AFp,f,t−1R
T
f ,t−1βAF×R + Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ), where DELp,f,t is an indicator vari-
able that takes the value of one if mutual fund f is deleted from plan p during year t and zero otherwise,
AFp,f,t−1 is an indicator for whether the trustee of pension plan p is affiliated with the management company
of fund f at the end of year t− 1, and Rf ,t−1 is a vector that captures piecewise-linear performance segments
of fund f . Performance percentiles Perf are formed based on the performance of each fund among funds of
the same style in the CRSP fund universe and range between zero and one. We use a two-segment specification
where LowPerfp,f,t−1 = min(Perfp,f,t−1, 0.5) and HighPerfp,f,t−1 = max(Perfp,f,t−1 − 0.5, 0). The other
lagged control variables in vector Z include the maximum return correlation of the fund with existing menu
options, the natural logarithm of option size, the number of options, the expense ratio, fund turnover, the
natural logarithm of the fund’s size, fund age, the standard deviation of the fund’s return, and fund style and
year fixed effects. We estimate the model by excluding the three largest trustees each year in the first column
and for the three largest trustees each year in the second column. Columns 3 and 4 estimate our results for
plans with below and above median asset size. Finally, in columns 5 and 6, we divide our sample into the
subperiods 1998-2006 and 2007-2009, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Small Large Small Large 1998-2006 2007-2009
Trustees Trustees Plans Plans
Affiliated −0.83∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗ −0.66∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.19) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15)
LowPerf −1.78∗∗∗ −2.26∗∗∗ −1.90∗∗∗ −1.99∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −2.05∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.31) (0.15) (0.19) (0.14) (0.19)
LowPerf×Affiliated 1.16∗∗∗ 0.64 1.10∗∗∗ 0.55∗ 0.22 1.12∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.44) (0.34) (0.32) (0.27) (0.36)
HighPerf −0.41∗∗∗ −0.67∗∗ −0.62∗∗∗ −0.31∗ 0.04 −0.93∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.28) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16)
HighPerf×Affiliated −0.75∗∗ 0.57 −0.03 −0.22 −0.13 0.05
(0.31) (0.38) (0.36) (0.29) (0.28) (0.32)
Maximum Corr 0.07∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Option Size) −0.08∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.17∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
No. of Options −0.01∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Exp. Ratio 0.45∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Turnover 0.08∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Log(Fund Size) −0.14∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Fund Age 0.01 0.03 0.02∗ 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Std. Dev. 0.03 −7.19∗∗∗ −1.44 −0.47 0.48 −9.45∗∗∗
(1.12) (2.03) (1.28) (1.57) (1.01) (1.78)
Observations 69,912 36,936 47,559 52,697 54,547 52,301
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Table 5: Logit Model of Fund Additions.
The table reports coefficient estimates for the following logit model: Prob(ADDp,f,t = 1) = Λ(AFp,f,t−1βAF +
RTf ,t−1βR + AFp,f,t−1R
T
f ,t−1βAF×R + Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ), where ADDp,f,t is an indicator variable that takes the
value of one if mutual fund f is added to plan p during year t and zero otherwise, AFp,f,t−1 is an indi-
cator for whether the trustee of plan p is affiliated with the management company of fund f at the end
of year t − 1, and Rf ,t−1 is a vector that captures piecewise-linear performance segments of fund f . Per-
formance percentiles Perf are formed based on the performance of each fund among funds of the same
style in the CRSP fund universe and range between zero and one. We include a linear performance speci-
fication, a two-segment specification where LowPerfp,f,t−1 = min(Perfp,f,t−1, 0.5) and HighPerfp,f,t−1 =
max(Perfp,f,t−1 − 0.5, 0), and a three-segment specification where LowPerfp,f,t−1 = min(Perfp,f,t−1, 0.2),
MidPerfp,f,t−1 = min(max(Perfp,f,t−1−0.2, 0), 0.6), and HighPerfp,f,t−1 = max(Perfp,f,t−1−0.8, 0). The
other lagged control variables in vector Z include the maximum return correlation of the fund with existing
menu options, the number of options, the expense ratio, fund turnover, the natural logarithm of the fund’s
size, fund age, the standard deviation of the fund’s return, and fund style and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *,
**, ***, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Linear Model Two-Segment Model Three-Segment Model
Affiliated 3.44∗∗∗ 2.61∗∗∗ 3.44∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗∗ 3.33∗∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23)
Perf 1.99∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
Perf×Aﬄiated −0.78∗∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.22)
LowPerf 2.86∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ −1.24
(0.34) (0.29) (0.78) (0.77)
LowPerf×Affiliated −0.75∗ −1.11∗∗ 0.37 −1.71
(0.43) (0.49) (1.33) (1.45)
Midperf 2.33∗∗∗ 1.90∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16)
MidPerf×Affiliated −1.16∗∗∗ −0.82∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.30)
HighPerf 1.51∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗ 0.19 2.77∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.24) (0.58) (0.55)
HighPerf×Affiliated −0.85∗∗ −0.41 0.43 0.54
(0.41) (0.43) (0.93) (1.02)
Maximum Corr 0.79∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
No. of Options 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exp. Ratio 0.11 0.08 0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Turnover 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Fund Size) 0.71∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Fund Age −0.11∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Std. Dev. −3.16∗∗ −3.96∗∗∗ −4.09∗∗∗
(1.23) (1.25) (1.24)
Observations 63,234,618 51,062,968 63,234,618 51,062,968 51,062,968 63,234,618
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Table 6: Logit Model for Fund Additions: Subsample Analysis.
The table reports coefficient estimates for the following logit model: Prob(ADDp,f,t = 1) = Λ(AFp,f,t−1βAF +
RTf ,t−1βR+AFp,f,t−1R
T
f ,t−1βAF×R+Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ), where ADDp,f,t is an indicator variable that takes the value
of one if mutual fund f is added to plan p during year t and zero otherwise, AFp,f,t−1 is an indicator for
whether the trustee of plan p is affiliated with the management company of fund f at the end of year t−1, and
Rf ,t−1 is a vector that captures piecewise-linear performance segments of fund f . Performance percentiles
Perf are formed based on the performance of each fund among funds of the same style in the CRSP fund
universe and range between zero and one. We use a two-segment specification where LowPerfp,f,t−1 =
min(Perfp,f,t−1, 0.5) and HighPerfp,f,t−1 = max(Perfp,f,t−1 − 0.5, 0). The other lagged control variables
in vector Z include the maximum return correlation of the fund with existing menu options, the number of
options, the expense ratio, fund turnover, the natural logarithm of the fund’s size, fund age, the standard
deviation of the fund’s return, and fund style and year fixed effects. We estimate the model by excluding the
three largest trustees each year in the first column and for the three largest trustees each year in the second
column. Columns 3 and 4 estimate our results for plans with below and above median asset size. Finally, in
columns 5 and 6, we divide our sample into the subperiods 1998-2006 and 2007-2009, respectively. Standard
errors are clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *,
**, ***, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Small Large Small Large 1998-2006 2007-2009
Trustees Trustees Plans Plans
Affiliated 3.50∗∗∗ 2.71∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.29) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.29)
LowPerf 0.96∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.41) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.39)
LowPerf×Affiliated −1.65∗∗∗ −1.28∗ −1.60∗∗∗ −0.77 −1.15∗∗ −0.79
(0.47) (0.68) (0.50) (0.58) (0.57) (0.81)
HighPerf 2.38∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 2.23∗∗∗ 2.27∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗ 1.88∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.33) (0.24) (0.26) (0.30) (0.24)
HighPerf×Affiliated −0.30 0.17 −0.42 −0.28 −0.87∗ 0.25
(0.41) (0.53) (0.44) (0.47) (0.48) (0.60)
Maximum Corr 0.89∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.34) (0.16) (0.24) (0.17) (0.25)
No. of Options 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exp. Ratio 0.21∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ −0.13 0.16∗ −0.07
(0.07) (0.16) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)
Turnover 0.00∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.04∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Log(Fund Size) 0.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Fund Age −0.08∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Std. Dev. −3.02∗∗ −5.97∗∗∗ −3.98∗∗∗ −3.85∗∗∗ −5.67∗∗∗ −2.31
(1.19) (2.00) (1.28) (1.43) (1.36) (2.45)
Observations 36,237,738 14,825,230 23,506,083 24,356,706 30,534,441 20,528,527
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Table 7: Fund Flow Regressions.
The table reports the coefficient estimates of the following OLS regression: NMGp,f,t = AFp,f,t−1βAF +
RTf ,t−1βR + AFp,f,t−1R
T
f ,t−1βAF×R + Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ + p,f,t, where the explanatory variables of the regression
are analogous to those in Table 3 with the exception of Plan Growth, which is a new variable added in this
table. Our first dependent variable (with corresponding results reported in columns 1 and 4 for all flows and
participant flows, respectively) is new money growth defined as NMG1p,f,t =
Vp,f,t−Vp,f,t−1(1+Rf,t)
Vp,f,t−1(1+Rf,t)
, where
Vp,f,t is the value of participants’ investments in fund f in plan p in year t and Rf,t is the fund’s return during
the year. We use two additional definitions for new money growth. NMG2 is new money growth defined
as NMG2p,f,t =
Vp,f,t−Vp,f,t−1(1+Rf,t)
Vp,f,t+Vp,f,t−1(1+Rf,t)
, with corresponding results reported in columns 2 and 5 for all flows
and participant flows, respectively. Finally, NMG3 shares the numerator with the previous two definitions
but replaces the denominator by lagged plan size adjusted for asset returns. Regression results using NMG3
as the dependent variable are reported in columns 3 and 6. Performance percentiles are calculated based on
funds in the same style in the CRSP fund universe over the prior three years. The regressions include fund
style and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
All Fund Flows Participant Flows Only
NMG1 NMG2 NMG3 NMG1 NMG2 NMG3
Affiliated 0.27∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.06
(0.04) (0.02) (0.24) (0.03) (0.01) (0.12)
LowPerf 0.55∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 3.77∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.04) (0.51) (0.06) (0.02) (0.28)
LowPerf×Affiliated −0.47∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −1.55∗∗ −0.14∗ −0.04 −0.60∗
(0.10) (0.05) (0.61) (0.08) (0.03) (0.34)
HighPerf 0.35∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.02) (0.33) (0.04) (0.02) (0.25)
HighPerf×Affiliated 0.08 −0.03 −0.85∗∗ 0.03 −0.00 −0.13
(0.08) (0.04) (0.43) (0.07) (0.02) (0.29)
Maximum Corr −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Option Size) −0.08∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Plan Growth 0.83∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 4.90∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 7.57∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.25) (0.03) (0.01) (0.27)
No. of Options −0.00∗ −0.00 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Expense Ratio −0.16∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05)
Turnover −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 −0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
Log(Fund Size) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.09∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Fund Age −0.01∗∗ −0.00 −0.02 −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Std. Dev. −0.06 −0.20 3.55∗∗ 0.07 0.00 2.93∗∗
(0.34) (0.18) (1.48) (0.29) (0.10) (1.15)
Observations 96,483 117,461 116,342 82,711 82,711 82,711
R-squared 0.16 0.52 0.14 0.25 0.22 0.11
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Table 8: Abnormal Returns of Affiliated and Unaffiliated Funds.
Panels A, B, and C of the table report the abnormal return αf,t of fund portfolio f at time t using the
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (FFM), the Fama and French (1993) model, and the CAPM model,
respectively, over our complete sample period using monthly fund return data. At the end of each calendar
year, we form equal-weighted portfolios of affiliated and unaffiliated domestic equity funds separately based on
whether the funds were kept on, deleted from, or added to the 401(k) menu (“No Changes,” “Deletions,”and
“Additions”) during the calendar year. This creates six portfolios. We then further subdivide these six groups
based on past performance. In particular, “All Funds,” refers to the six portfolios and “Lowest Quintile,”
(“Lowest Decile”) refers to a sub-portfolio in each group that contains only those funds that also rank in the
lowest performance quintile (decile) relative to funds in their style in CRSP during the prior three years. The
performance measures are reported in % per month. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Carhart Alphas
No Changes Deletions Additions
Affiliated Unaffiliated Affiliated Unaffiliated Affiliated Unaffiliated
Funds Funds Funds Funds Funds Funds
Lowest Decile −0.33∗∗ −0.08 −0.28∗ −0.15 −0.01 0.12
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.28) (0.18)
Lowest Quintile −0.20∗ −0.11 −0.19∗ −0.13 −0.11 −0.02
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11)
All Funds −0.00 −0.06 −0.07 −0.09 −0.00 −0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Panel B: Fama-French Alphas
No Changes Deletions Additions
Affiliated Unaffiliated Affiliated Unaffiliated Affiliated Unaffiliated
Funds Funds Funds Funds Funds Funds
Lowest Decile −0.33∗∗ −0.08 −0.28 −0.15 −0.02 0.13
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.27) (0.19)
Lowest Quintile −0.20∗ −0.10 −0.19∗ −0.13 −0.11 −0.02
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12)
All Funds −0.00 −0.06 −0.07 −0.09 −0.00 −0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Panel C: CAPM Alphas
No Changes Deletions Additions
Affiliated Unaffiliated Affiliated Unaffiliated Affiliated Unaffiliated
Funds Funds Funds Funds Funds Funds
Lowest Decile −0.09 0.22 −0.12 0.14 0.06 0.39
(0.17) (0.26) (0.20) (0.31) (0.31) (0.24)
Lowest Quintile 0.03 0.12 −0.12 0.07 0.08 0.23
(0.18) (0.18) (0.14) (0.24) (0.18) (0.18)
All Funds 0.02 −0.01 −0.03 −0.02 0.02 −0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
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1
This internet appendix provides supplemental analyses to the main tables and figures in ‘It
Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans.’
1 Data
This section explains in more detail the data construction. We collect the investment options
offered in 401(k) plans from Form 11-K filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). All plans offering company stock as an investment option for plan participants are
required to file this form with the SEC. The filing provides an overall description of the plan,
identifies the trustee, all individual choices available to participants (the menu), and the
accumulated value of assets invested in each of these vehicles at the end of the fiscal year.
We manually collect these data as disclosure is not standardized across plans and firms.
We start by webcrawling the SEC’s website from 1998 to 2009 to identify all companies that
report Form 11-K. We collect 26,624 links to 11-K filings but restrict this sample to companies
covered by COMPUSTAT.1 We eliminate filings that have been submitted to the SEC in
duplicate and consolidate amendments with the corresponding original filings.
From these documents we collect all tables that describe the “Schedule of Assets” of the
plan. In most cases, the table reports the complete set of investment options offered by the plan,
including the employers’ own stock, other common stocks, mutual funds, separate accounts, or
commingled trusts, as well as the current value of investments in these options at the end of
the fiscal year. Occasionally, the table describes only those investment options that capture
more than 5% of the plan’s assets or alternatively, only mutual fund investments. To overcome
the incomplete and non-standardized disclosure of these tables, we supplement our Form 11-K
information with plan level data from Form 5500. The resulting dataset has more than 302,000
observations, containing information at the firm-year-plan-fund level.
1Our data collection initially included paper filings (not only pdfs of electronic documents). However, paper
filings have been removed from the SEC’s website while our data collection was still in progress. We only
partially incorporate these plan year observations.
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To obtain information on the characteristics of the mutual funds included in DC plans, we
match all funds listed on the menus to the CRSP Survivorship Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund
database. To aid our matching task, we proceed in several steps. We start by filtering our
menu options for non-mutual fund assets. These include, for instance, common stocks, bonds,
insurance products, or guaranteed investment contracts. In approximately 15% of the cases,
the SEC Form 11-K contains information on the number of shares of each asset held by the
plan in addition to the market value of the position. This allows us to calculate the net asset
value (NAV) of the position on the report date. When the NAV information is available, we
match the menu choice to the CRSP mutual fund files by NAV and date. For the rest of the
sample, we hand match the 11-K funds to the mutual fund database by name.
Since most plans do not identify the exact share class of the fund offered on the menu, we
establish the link between our 401(k) sample and the CRSP Survivorship Bias-free Mutual
Fund database at the fund-level, that is, we combine information on all available share classes
of each fund in CRSP into fund-level variables. Accordingly, fund age is calculated as the age
of the oldest share class, fund size is the sum of the total net assets of all share classes, and
fund returns and expense ratios are calculated as the total net asset value weighted average
returns and expense ratios of the share classes, respectively. We also classify each mutual fund
in our sample as “balanced,” “bond,” “domestic equity,” “international equity,” or “other.” We
create separate dummy variables for money market funds, target date funds, and index funds.
We manually group funds into target date and index fund categories based on fund name.
Finally, we perform two additional data steps to complete our sample. First, we assign
unique plan IDs to create time-series at the plan level. Form 11-K does not always disclose the
plan number. Companies occasionally sponsor multiple plans for different subsidiaries, salaried
and hourly employees, or unionized and non-unionized workers. In order to track the same plan
over time, we collect the plan Employer Identification Number (EIN) and Plan Number (PN)
by searching Form 5500 by plan name and assets. Once established, the link with Form 5500
allows us to collect additional information on total participants, active participants, employer
and employee contributions, total assets, and whether the plan is collectively bargained or not.
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We manually collect the trustee name (and any trustee change occurring during the
year) from the plan description available in Form 11-K. We supplement and cross check this
information with the name of the trustee disclosed in Form 5500.
2 Menu Changes
This section provides additional robustness tests for fund deletions and additions.
2.1 Fund Deletions by Performance Deciles
Table A-1 summarizes mean annual deletion frequencies (as a %) by mutual fund affiliation.
These deletion frequencies are analogous to those reported in Figure 1 in the paper, but the
table also reports the results based on performance percentile ranks that are determined by
prior one and five year performance evaluation horizons. Panel A includes the full sample,
Panel B includes only funds that appear contemporaneously as affiliated and unaffiliated funds.
Standard errors in these panels are clustered at the fund level. Panels C and D report identical
difference test but use the Fama-MacBeth methodology to calculate the deletion frequencies
and Newey-West standard errors using a lag length of 3.
2.2 Predicted Probabilities for Fund Deletions
Figure A-1 displays average predicted probabilities from the various logit specifications for
deletions corresponding to the six columns of Table 3 in the paper. The predicted probabilities
for affiliated and unaffiliated funds are evaluated at different performance levels keeping the
other control variables at their overall sample means. The results indicate that the sensitivity
of deletions to prior performance is larger for unaffiliated funds.
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2.3 Linear Probability Model of Fund Deletions
In Table A-2 we reproduce the results reported in Table 3 in the main text using the linear
probability framework instead of the logit model. Standard errors in the table are clustered at
the fund level.
Consistent with Figure 1 and Table 3 in the main text, the table shows that affiliated funds
– and especially poorly-performing affiliated funds – are significantly less likely to be deleted.
For example, based on the results in column 2, affiliated funds are 10% less likely to be deleted
than unaffiliated funds. Furthermore, a ten percentage point increase in the performance
percentile for an unaffiliated fund decreases the probability of deletion by 1.7%, whereas the
same performance increase for an affiliated fund decreases the probability of deletion by only
0.7%. Thus, the sensitivity of deletions to inferior fund performance is less than half of that
of unaffiliated funds. The two-segment specification summarized in the fourth column of
Table A-2 indicates that most of the performance sensitivity is driven by below-median funds.
To provide further evidence on the trustee’s incentive to support distressed funds, Table A-3
examines the role of non-DC money flows in more detail. We create an indicator variable
that equals one if the fund experiences an outflow from its non-DC clients in the past year
and zero otherwise, and an interaction term of this indicator variable with our Affiliated
dummy. Non-DC flows are calculated as NonDCAssetsf,t −NonDCAssetsf,t−1 × (1 +Rf,t),
as described in footnote 21 of the main text. Unfortunately, the Pensions & Investments survey
is only available for a relatively small subsample of the mutual fund universe. We therefore
include an additional indicator variable in our model that takes the value of one if information
on non-DC assets is missing and zero otherwise, and an interaction term between this missing
flow variable and our Affiliated dummy. Panel A of the table reports the results of adding
these two additional explanatory variables and the interaction terms to the models estimated
in Table 3 in the main text, while Panel B shows the corresponding linear probability results.
In Table A-4 we re-estimate the results for Table 4 in the main text using the linear
probability setup. The table indicates that our favoritism story holds for small and large
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trustees, small and large plans, and prior or after the PPA when using the linear probability
estimation framework.
2.4 Robustness Tests for Fund Deletions
Table A-5 shows the results of our logit model specified in equation (1) in the main text using
1- and 5-year performance evaluation horizons and various sample restrictions. Panel A sum-
marizes the coefficient estimates from a logit model, while Panel B contains the corresponding
linear probability results. In columns 1 and 2, we show the results from using 1-year and
5-year prior performance horizons. In columns 3 and 4, we show that our results remain after
controlling for trustee and fund fixed effects, respectively. In column 5, we re-estimate our
results using information only on those plans that are trusteed by a mutual fund family. In
column 6, we only include mutual fund trustees and require that they offer at least 10 funds
in their fund family. The rationale behind excluding trustees with only a few funds in their
product lineup is that these trustees could be large financial conglomerates or banks with a
small mutual fund arm. In column 7 we exclude all plan year observations when a trustee
change occurs, as in these plan years fund exits and entries are likely driven by the plan
sponsor.
Finally, in columns 8-10 we restrict the sample of funds considered. In column 8 we exclude
all target date funds since these funds are often used as default investment options. In column
9, we restrict our sample to equity funds, while in column 10 we only include actively managed
funds.
2.5 Fund Additions by Performance Deciles
To investigate how a fund’s propensity to be added to a menu depends on its affiliation, we
determine the addition frequency of each fund in the CRSP fund universe as an affiliated and
unaffiliated menu choice, respectively, as described in Section 4.4 in the paper. Table A-6
summarizes mean annual addition frequencies (as a %) by mutual fund affiliation. These
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addition frequencies are analogous to those reported in Figure 2 in the paper, but the table
also reports the results based on performance percentile ranks that are determined by prior
one and five year performance evaluation horizons. Panel A includes the full sample, Panel B
includes only those funds which are offered by fund families that serve as trustees for at least
one plan in our sample. Standard errors in these panels are clustered at the fund level. Panels
C and D report identical difference test but use the Fama-MacBeth methodology to calculate
the addition frequencies and corresponding standard errors.
2.6 Predicted Probabilities for Fund Additions
Figure A-2 displays average predicted probabilities from our logit model for additions tabulated
in the six columns of Table 5 in the paper. The predicted probabilities are evaluated for
affiliated and unaffiliated funds at different performance levels keeping the other control
variables at their overall sample means. Since the addition rates are substantially larger for
affiliated funds, the figures use separate axes to measure the addition probabilities for affiliated
and unaffiliated funds.
2.7 Robustness Tests for Fund Additions
Table A-7 shows the results of our logit model specified in equation (2) in the main text using
various sample restrictions. In columns 1 and 2, we show the results from using 1-year and
5-year prior performance horizons. In column 3, we re-estimate our results using information
only on those plans that are trusteed by a mutual fund family. In column 4, we only include
mutual fund trustees and require that they offer at least 10 funds in their fund family. The
rationale behind excluding trustees with only a few funds in their product lineup is that these
trustees could be large financial conglomerates or banks with a small mutual fund arm. In
column 5 we exclude all plan year observations when a trustee change occurs, as in these plan
years fund exits and entries are likely driven by the plan sponsor.
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Finally, in columns 6-8 we restrict the sample of funds considered. In column 6 we exclude
all target date funds since these funds are often used as default investment options. In column
7, we restrict our sample to equity funds, while in column 8 we only include actively managed
funds. These results are consistent with the results in our baseline specification.
2.8 Newly Added Funds by Affiliation
This section provides some additional results on the determinants of fund additions. We
investigate the characteristics of affiliated and unaffiliated funds based on our sample of newly
added funds. Table 2 of the paper provides univariate evidence that newly listed affiliated
funds exhibit lower past performance than unaffiliated funds in the same category. We confirm
this finding in Figure A-3. The figure describes the cumulative distribution of affiliated and
unaffiliated fund additions separately. Fund performance is measured by the performance
percentile of each fund in the universe of CRSP funds in the same style over the past three
years. The results reveal that the proportion of unaffiliated funds with strong past performance
is larger compared to that of affiliated funds, while affiliated funds are more likely to come
to the menu with a mediocre performance record. We confirm that the distributions are
statistically significantly different at the 1% level using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
To further explore the difference in past performance across newly added affiliated and
unaffiliated funds, we estimate the following logit model for fund addition type:
Prob(AFADDp,f,t = 1) = Λ
(
βPerf × Perfp,f,t−1 + ZTp,f ,t−1βZ
)
, (1)
where AFADDp,f,t takes the value of one if fund f added to plan p at time t is an affiliated
fund, and zero otherwise. Since the sample used in this analysis includes only fund additions,
it reflects the choice between selecting an affiliated fund over an unaffiliated fund. Perfp,f,t−1
is the performance percentile of mutual fund f over the previous one, three, or five years
based on the universe of CRSP funds in the same investment style and it enters the analysis
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as a linear term. Our additional controls include various fund characteristics and plan level
variables, such as the number of menu options and plan size.
The results are reported in Table A-8 with standard errors clustered at the fund level.
Consistent with menu favoritism, affiliated funds come to the menu with a significantly
weaker track record even after controlling for other fund characteristics. This is shown by our
Perfp,f,t−1 coefficient estimates, which are significantly negative at the one percent level for
each of our performance measures.
3 New Money Growth
Figure A-4 provides histograms of the percentage flows into various plan options for affiliated
and unaffiliated funds in the lowest performance decile over the previous three years.
4 Future Performance
In Section 6 of the paper, we compute the abnormal return αf,t of fund portfolio f at time t
using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (FFM) over our complete sample period
using monthly fund return data from the CRSP Mutual Fund database:
Rf,t −RTB,t = αf,t + βMf,t(RM,t −RTB,t) + βSMBf,t (RS,t −RB,t)
+βHMLf,t (RH,t −RL,t) + βUMDf,t (RU,t −RD,t) + f,t. (2)
The return of fund portfolio f during time period t is denoted by Rf,t. The index M corresponds
to the market portfolio and the index TB to the risk-free Treasury bill rate. Portfolios of
small and large stocks are denoted by S and B, respectively; portfolios of stocks with high
and low ratios between their book values and their market values are denoted by H and L,
respectively; and portfolios of stocks with relatively high and low returns during the previous
year are denoted by U and D, respectively. We obtain monthly factor returns and the risk-free
rate from Kenneth French’s website.
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In Section 6 of the paper, we form equal-weighted portfolios of affiliated and unaffiliated
domestic equity funds separately at the end of each calendar year, as described in the section.
Table 7 in the paper reports the abnormal return (α) of these portfolios using the Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor model (FFM), the Fama and French (1993) model, and the CAPM model,
respectively, over our complete sample period using monthly fund return data. In Panels A,
B, and C of Table A-9 we augment these results by reporting the difference in the abnormal
returns of the affiliated and unaffiliated fund portfolios in each category.
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Figure A-1: Predicted deletion probabilities by prior performance and fund affiliation.
The figure displays predicted probabilities from our logit models for fund deletions by prior
performance. We calculate these predicted probabilities by evaluating them at the means of the
other control variables. Fitted probabilities are obtained from the logit models estimated in Table
3 in the paper.
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Figure A-2: Predicted addition probabilities by prior performance and fund affiliation.
The figure displays predicted probabilities from our logit models for fund additions by prior
performance. We calculate these predicted probabilities by evaluating them at the means of the
other control variables. Fitted probabilities are obtained from the logit models estimated in Table
5 in the paper. Affiliated probabilities are depicted relative to the axis on the left, while the
corresponding axis for unaffiliated funds is on the right side of the figure.
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Figure A-3: Cumulative distribution of mutual fund additions by performance and
fund affiliation. The figure shows the cumulative distribution of the funds that are added to a
401(k) menu at some point during our sample period by performance decile and affiliation. The
dark line shows the cumulative fraction of affiliated funds by performance deciles, while the grey
line provides the corresponding values for unaffiliated funds. Performance deciles are created from
percentile performance ranks. Fund performance is ranked relative to all other mutual funds in
CRSP with the same style over the prior 36 months.
14
Panel A: Affiliated funds
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
?1.0 ?0.7 ?0.3 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.3
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
New?Money?Growth
Panel B: Unaffiliated funds
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
?1.0 ?0.7 ?0.3 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.3
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
New?Money?Growth
Figure A-4: New money growth of poorly-performing affiliated and unaffiliated funds.
The figure displays the distribution of fund flows to poorly-performing mutual funds on the menu by
affiliation. Fund flows, or the growth rate of new money NMGp,f,t of fund f held in 401(k) plan p at
time t is defined by NMGp,f,t = [Vp,f,t−Vp,f,t−1(1 +Rf,t)]/[Vp,f,t−1(1 +Rf,t)]. The numerator captures
the dollar change in the value of participants’ investments (Vp,f,t) in fund f in plan p in year t after
adjusting for price appreciation Rf,t during the year. The denominator is defined as the projected
value of the lagged plan position in the fund without any new flow of money. If an investment option
is deleted from a plan menu, then NMG equals exactly -100%. In Panels A and B, the distributions
describe fund flows to those affiliated and unaffiliated funds, respectively, that fall into the worst
performance decile of the universe of mutual funds in the same style.
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Table A-2: Linear Probability Model of Fund Deletions.
The table reports the coefficient estimates for the following linear probability model: DELp,f,t = AFp,f,t−1βAF +
RTf ,t−1βR+AFp,f,t−1R
T
f ,t−1βAF×R+Z
T
p,f ,t−1βZ+p,f,t, where DELp,f,t is an indicator variable that takes the
value of one if mutual fund f is deleted from plan p during year t and zero otherwise, AFp,f,t−1 is an indicator
for whether the trustee of pension plan p is affiliated with the management company of fund f at the end of
year t− 1, and Rf ,t−1 is a vector that captures piecewise-linear performance segments of fund f . Performance
percentiles Perf are formed based on the prior 3-year performance of each fund among funds of the same
style in the CRSP fund universe and range between zero and one. We include a linear performance speci-
fication, a two-segment specification where LowPerfp,f,t−1 = min(Perfp,f,t−1, 0.5) and HighPerfp,f,t−1 =
max(Perfp,f,t−1 − 0.5, 0), and a three-segment specification where LowPerfp,f,t−1 = min(Perfp,f,t−1, 0.2),
MidPerfp,f,t−1 = min(max(Perfp,f,t−1−0.2, 0), 0.6), and HighPerfp,f,t−1 = max(Perfp,f,t−1−0.8, 0). The
other lagged control variables in vector Z include the maximum return correlation of the fund with existing
menu options, the natural logarithm of option size, the number of options, the expense ratio, fund turnover, the
natural logarithm of the fund’s size, fund age, the standard deviation of the fund’s return, and fund style and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses. Significance
levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Linear Model Two-Segment Model Three-Segment Model
Affiliated −0.10∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
LowPerf −0.30∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ −0.52∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.12)
LowPerf×Affiliated 0.16∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.18)
MidPerf −0.17∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
MidPerf×Affiliated 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HighPerf −0.08∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
HighPerf*Affiliated 0.06∗∗ −0.01 0.06 −0.17∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09)
Maximum Corr 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Option Size) −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
No. of Options −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Expense Ratio 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Turnover 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Fund Size) −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fund Age 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Std. Dev. −0.09 −0.18 −0.19
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
Observations 167,952 106,848 167,952 106,848 167,952 106,848
R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08
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Table A-3: Fund Deletions: Fund Distress.
The table reports the coefficient estimates for the three models described in Table A-2 augmented by information
on the capital flows of the fund’s non-DC clients. In particular, we add the following additional explanatory
variables. NonDC Flowf,t−1 < 0 is an indicator variable for whether the non-DC flows of the fund in year
t− 1 are negative. Missing NonDC Flowf,t−1 is an indicator that takes the value of one if information on the
non-DC flows of the fund in year t− 1 is missing. We also interact these variables with our Affiliated dummy.
The other lagged control variables Z include the maximum return correlation of the fund with existing menu
options, the natural logarithm of option size, the number of options, the expense ratio, fund turnover, the
natural logarithm of the fund’s size, fund age, the standard deviation of the fund’s return, and fund style
and year fixed effects. The logit and linear probability estimates are shown in Panels A and B, respectively.
Standard errors - reported in parentheses - are clustered at the fund level. Significance levels are denoted by *,
**, ***, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Logit Model
Linear Model Two-Segment Model Three-Segment Model
Affiliated −0.65∗∗∗ −0.58∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗ −0.78∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15)
LowPerf −2.02∗∗∗ −1.69∗∗∗ −2.19∗∗∗ −1.97∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.34) (0.39)
LowPerf×Affiliated 0.50∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.62 1.49∗∗
(0.20) (0.22) (0.66) (0.75)
Midperf −1.48∗∗∗ −0.99∗∗∗ −1.64∗∗∗ −1.21∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
MidPerf×Affiliated 0.47∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.26∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15)
HighPerf −0.97∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ 0.51 1.78∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.41) (0.37)
HighPerf×Affiliated 0.43∗∗ −0.17 0.69 −0.74
(0.20) (0.21) (0.76) (0.79)
NonDC Flow<0 0.49∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
NonDC Flow<0×Affiliated −0.21∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.21∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.22∗∗∗ −0.06
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Missing NonDC Flow 0.39∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Missing NonDC Flow×Affiliated 0.05 −0.03 0.04 −0.02 0.03 −0.03
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Maximum Corr 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Option Size) −0.08∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of Options −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exp. Ratio 0.59∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Turnover 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Fund Size) −0.16∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Fund Age 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Std. Dev. −0.18 −0.79 −0.87
(1.07) (1.05) (1.03)
Observations 167,952 106,848 167,952 106,848 167,952 106,848
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Panel B: Linear Probability Model
Linear Model Two-Segment Model Three-Segment Model
Affiliated −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
LowPerf −0.28∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.11)
LowPerf×Affiliated 0.16∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.12) (0.18)
Midperf −0.16∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
MidPerf×Affiliated 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HighPerf −0.07∗∗∗ −0.04∗ 0.09∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
HighPerf*Affiliated 0.04 −0.01 0.00 −0.14
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09)
Lag(NonDC Flow<0) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag(NonDC Flow<0)×Affiliated −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Missing NonDC Flow 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Missing NonDC Flow×Affiliated −0.01 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.03∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Maximum Corr 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Option Size) −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
No. of Options −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exp. Ratio 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Turnover 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Fund Size) −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fund Age −0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Std. Dev. −0.09 −0.18 −0.19
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
Observations 167,952 106,848 167,952 106,848 167,952 106,848
R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.08
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Table A-4: Linear Probability Model for Fund Deletions: Subsample Analysis.
The table reports the OLS coefficient estimates from a linear probability specification for our baseline two-
segment piecewise linear model for fund deletions described in equation (1) in the paper for various subsamples
of our data. We estimate the model by excluding the three largest trustees each year in the first column and
for the three largest trustees in the second column. Columns 3 and 4 estimate our results for plans with below
and above median asset sizes. Finally, in columns 5 and 6, we divide our sample into the subperiods 1998-2006
and 2007-2009, respectively. The regressions include fund style and year fixed effects. Standard errors in this
table are clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *, **,
***, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Small Large Small Large 1998-2006 2007-2009
Trustees Trustees Plans Plans
Affiliated −0.14∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
LowPerf −0.31∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
LowPerf×Affiliated 0.21∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
HighPerf −0.04∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.03 0.02 −0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
HighPerf×Affiliated −0.04 0.06 0.01 −0.02 −0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Maximum Corr 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Option Size) −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
No. of Options −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗ −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Exp. Ratio 0.06∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Turnover 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Log(Fund Size) −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fund Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Std. Dev. −0.01 −0.83∗∗∗ −0.25 −0.10 0.05 −1.30∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.24) (0.16) (0.19) (0.15) (0.37)
Observations 69,912 36,936 47,559 52,697 54,547 52,301
R-squared 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.08
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Table A-8: Logit Model for Affiliated Fund Additions.
The table reports the coefficient estimates of the logit model for affiliated fund additions: Prob(AFADDp,f,t =
1) = Λ(Perff,t−1βPerf + ZTp,f ,t−1βZ), where AF
ADD
p,f,t−1 is an indicator variable equal to one if mutual fund f
added to the plan p during year t is affiliated with the management company acting as the plan’s trustee and
zero otherwise. Perfp,f,t−1 is the performance percentile of mutual fund f over the previous one, three, or
five years and is included as a percentage. The overall performance percentile of each fund depends on the
performance of the fund relative to other funds in CRSP in the same style. The other lagged control variables
Z include the number of options, the expense ratio, fund turnover, the natural logarithm of the fund’s size,
fund age, the standard deviation of the fund’s return (all measured during the previous year), and unreported
indicator variables for specific fund styles, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund
level and are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
1 Year 3 Years 5 Years
Perf (1 YR) −0.71∗∗∗
(0.12)
Perf (3 YR) −0.77∗∗∗
(0.15)
Perf (5 YR) −0.77∗∗∗
(0.17)
No. of Options 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log(Plan Assets) 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Exp. Ratio −1.00∗∗∗ −1.01∗∗∗ −1.01∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Turnover −0.09 −0.09 −0.09
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Log(Fund Size) −0.05 −0.04 −0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Fund Age −0.13∗∗ −0.14∗∗ −0.15∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Std. Dev. −0.28∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗ −0.24∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant −0.80 −0.70 −0.73
(0.67) (0.67) (0.67)
Observations 20,483 20,483 20,483
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Table A-9: Differences in the Abnormal Returns of Affiliated and Unaffiliated Funds.
Panels A, B, and C of the table report the difference in abnormal returns (α) across the affiliated and
unaffiliated portfolios using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model (FFM), the Fama and French (1993)
model, and the CAPM model, respectively, over our complete sample period using monthly fund return data.
At the end of each calendar year, we form equal-weighted portfolios of trustee and non-trustee domestic equity
funds separately based on whether the funds were kept on, deleted from, or added to the 401(k) menu (“No
Changes,” “Deletions,”and “Additions”) during the calendar year. This creates six portfolios. We then further
subdivide these six groups based on past performance. In particular, “All Funds,” refers to the overall six
portfolios and “Lowest Quintile,” (“Lowest Decile”) refers to a sub-portfolio in each group that contains only
those funds that also rank in the lowest performance quintile (decile) relative to funds in their style in CRSP
during the prior three years. The performance measures are reported in % per month. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *, **, ***, which correspond to 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Carhart Alpha Differences
No Changes Deletions Additions
Lowest Decile −0.25∗∗ −0.13 −0.10
(0.12) (0.16) (0.22)
Lowest Quintile −0.10 −0.06 −0.09
(0.07) (0.12) (0.13)
All Funds 0.06∗∗ 0.02 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Panel B: Fama-French Alpha Differences
No Changes Deletions Additions
Lowest Decile −0.26∗∗ −0.13 −0.15
(0.13) (0.17) (0.23)
Lowest Quintile −0.10 −0.06 −0.09
(0.07) (0.13) (0.14)
All Funds 0.06∗∗ 0.02 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Panel C: CAPM Alpha Differences
No Changes Deletions Additions
Lowest Decile −0.32∗ −0.25 −0.37
(0.16) (0.21) (0.32)
Lowest Quintile −0.09 −0.19 −0.15
(0.07) (0.18) (0.21)
All Funds 0.03 −0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
28
